ECO 550 Week 7 Case Study: Dynamic Pricing, Auction Formats and Valuing Wells Fargo’s Consumer Banking Division
ECO 550 Week 7 Case Study: Dynamic Pricing, Auction Formats and Valuing Wells Fargo’s Consumer Banking Division
ECO 550 Week 7 Assignment Case Study: Dynamic Pricing – Strategies for Enhancing Profits. Using the Week 5 and Week 6 readings as foundations, write a 5–7 page paper in which you:
- Compare and contrast surge versus congestion pricing, with a specific current example of each.
- Compare and contrast how the English and Dutch auctions, and the sealed-bid first-price and Vickrey auctions, uncover value, with a specific example of each.
- Analyze an actual auction used by (a) a state or federal government or agency and (b) a for-profit business, explaining the auction type and how it finds the best price.
- Read Senator Warren’s letter to the Fed on Wells Fargo’s FHC status; explain how an auction to sell the Wells Fargo consumer-facing banking division might determine its value, and recommend an auction type.
- Use at least three quality resources, cited in Strayer Writing Standards format.
Uber, real-time supply and demand
NYC toll, externalities
Open ascending vs. descending clock
Bid shading vs. truthful bids
Treasury, eBay
Two-stage sealed-bid recommendation
Download the paper (.docx)
Model response
Original example for study purposes (about 1,460 words). Add citations to your Week 5 and Week 6 readings and format per Strayer Writing Standards.
Introduction
Firms rarely know the exact value buyers place on what they sell. Dynamic pricing and auctions are two ways to discover that value. Dynamic pricing adjusts posted prices in real time as conditions change, while auctions let buyers reveal what they are willing to pay through bidding. This paper compares surge and congestion pricing, explains how four auction formats uncover value, analyzes auctions used by government and business and recommends an auction approach for a hypothetical sale of Wells Fargo’s consumer banking division.
Surge Pricing Versus Congestion Pricing
Both surge and congestion pricing raise prices when demand is high, but they pursue different goals. Surge pricing is a profit- and supply-management tool used by private firms. When ride requests in an area exceed available drivers, Uber’s pricing system raises fares for that area. The higher price rations rides to riders who value them most and draws more drivers to the area, moving the market toward equilibrium (Uber, n.d.). Prices change minute to minute and vary by location, so surge pricing responds to real-time demand rather than a fixed schedule.
Congestion pricing is a public policy tool that charges users for the external costs they impose on others, such as traffic delays and pollution. New York City launched the first U.S. cordon congestion toll on January 5, 2025, charging most passenger vehicles $9 to enter Manhattan below 60th Street during peak hours, with lower overnight tolls; revenue funds transit improvements (Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA], n.d.). The program survived a federal attempt to end it when a U.S. district judge ruled in March 2026 that it could continue (Bloomberg, 2026).
The key differences lie in purpose, ownership and predictability. Surge pricing maximizes a firm’s revenue and matches supply to demand; congestion pricing corrects a market failure by internalizing an externality. Surge prices are unpredictable and set by algorithm, while congestion tolls follow a published schedule by time of day. Both, however, use price to change behavior: surge pricing shifts riders to other times and draws drivers in, and congestion pricing encourages drivers to switch to transit or travel off-peak.
Both strategies also carry risks. Surge pricing can trigger consumer backlash when prices spike during emergencies, which is why ride-hailing firms have capped surges during declared disasters. Congestion pricing raises equity concerns because a flat toll takes a larger share of income from lower-income drivers, which is why many programs pair tolls with transit investment and credits for some residents. From a managerial perspective, the lesson is that dynamic pricing works best when customers understand why prices change and see a fair benefit, such as shorter waits or faster commutes.
How Auction Formats Uncover Value
Auctions differ in how much information they reveal and in how bidders should behave. In private-value settings, each bidder knows what the item is worth to them; in common-value settings, such as oil leases or a bank franchise, the item has one true value that bidders estimate with error. The format matters because it shapes whether bidders reveal their true valuations or shade their bids strategically.
English Auction Versus Dutch Auction
In an English auction, the price rises as bidders compete openly until only one remains. Because bidders see others’ bids, the auction reveals information, and the winner pays roughly the second-highest bidder’s valuation plus one increment. Fine-art houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s use English auctions; competitive bidding on a painting shows how much collectors collectively value it. In a Dutch auction, the price starts high and falls until a bidder accepts. The first bidder to stop the clock wins at that price, so bidders must decide how much to shade their bids below their true value. The Royal FloraHolland flower auctions in the Netherlands use descending clocks to sell perishable flowers quickly. The English format reveals value through open competition, whereas the Dutch format is faster but uncovers only the winner’s willingness to pay, not the full demand curve.
Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction Versus Vickrey Auction
In a sealed-bid first-price auction, bidders submit one private bid, and the highest bidder pays what it bid. Because winners pay their own bid, bidders shade bids below their true value, much as in a Dutch auction. Government construction contracts are a common example: firms submit sealed bids, and the lowest qualified bid (in a reverse auction) wins. Google Ad Manager moved its display advertising auctions to a first-price model in 2019. In a Vickrey (sealed-bid second-price) auction, the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. Vickrey (1961) showed that this design makes bidding one’s true value the dominant strategy, since a bidder’s own bid determines only whether it wins, not what it pays. eBay’s automatic bidding works similarly: the winner pays one increment above the second-highest maximum bid. The Vickrey design therefore tends to uncover bidders’ true valuations more directly, while the first-price design requires strategic shading that hides true values.
Auctions in Practice
Government: U.S. Treasury Securities Auctions
The U.S. Department of the Treasury sells bills, notes and bonds through sealed-bid, single-price (uniform-price) auctions. Competitive bidders submit the yield they will accept and the amount they want; Treasury accepts bids from the lowest yield upward until the offering is filled, and all winning bidders receive the same “high” yield (TreasuryDirect, n.d.). Primary dealers, banks, investment funds and foreign central banks participate, and noncompetitive bidders, often individual investors, simply accept the yield set at auction. This format solves the pricing problem by aggregating thousands of bids into a market-clearing price, which minimizes borrowing costs while encouraging bidders to bid close to their true valuations because they do not pay their own bid. [Your course may prefer an FCC spectrum auction, which uses an ascending clock format; either example works.]
For-Profit Business: eBay
eBay hosts millions of online auctions using proxy (automatic) bidding. A buyer enters the maximum amount they will pay, and the system bids incrementally on their behalf; the winner pays one increment above the second-highest maximum bid. This is an English auction with Vickrey-like pricing. It solves the problem of finding the best price for unique or used goods whose value is uncertain, such as collectibles, by letting buyers across the world compete and revealing what the market will bear. Sellers can also set reserve prices to protect against selling too low.
Valuing Wells Fargo’s Consumer Banking Division by Auction
In September 2021, Senator Elizabeth Warren urged the Federal Reserve to revoke Wells Fargo’s status as a financial holding company and require it to separate its traditional banking activities from its nonbanking activities, citing repeated consumer abuses and an OCC fine of $250 million (Warren, 2021). Although the Federal Reserve lifted Wells Fargo’s asset cap in June 2025 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2025), the scenario remains a useful case for valuation by auction.
The consumer-facing division, with millions of deposit customers, branches and loan portfolios, has no single market price. An auction would determine value by inviting qualified buyers, such as large bank holding companies or private equity consortia approved by regulators, to bid based on their own estimates of future cash flows, cost savings and strategic fit. Competitive bidding would reveal the highest value any buyer places on the franchise, which is likely to exceed a book-value estimate because buyers can realize synergies.
I recommend a two-stage sealed-bid first-price auction. In stage one, prequalified bidders submit nonbinding indications of interest after reviewing confidential data. In stage two, a short list submits binding sealed bids, and the highest compliant bid wins. This format, standard in large corporate divestitures and similar to how the FDIC markets failed banks, protects confidential information, limits collusion among a small number of bidders and allows regulators to evaluate antitrust and safety concerns before closing. A Vickrey design would encourage truthful bidding in theory, but sellers and regulators rarely use it for one-of-a-kind assets because the winning price can fall well below the winner’s bid, which creates political and fairness concerns. An English auction would reveal more information but risks bidder collusion and exposes sensitive negotiations publicly. Because this is a common-value asset, bidders should also guard against the winner’s curse by bidding conservatively, and the seller can counter this with thorough due diligence data so that estimates converge.
Conclusion
Surge and congestion pricing both use dynamic prices to manage demand, one for profit and one for public welfare. Auctions uncover value in different ways: open ascending formats reveal information, descending and first-price formats encourage bid shading and the Vickrey format rewards truthful bidding. Governments and businesses use these designs to discover prices for securities and goods, and a two-stage sealed-bid auction would be the most practical way to value and sell a large banking division under regulatory oversight.
References
Bloomberg. (2026, March 3). NYC congestion pricing program can continue, US judge rules. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/nyc-congestion-pricing-program-can-continue-us-judge-rules
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2025, June 3). Federal Reserve Board announces Wells Fargo’s asset growth restriction has been lifted [Press release]. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20250603a.htm
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (n.d.). Congestion relief zone tolls. https://congestionrelief.mta.info
TreasuryDirect. (n.d.). Understanding pricing and interest rates. U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://www.treasurydirect.gov
Uber. (n.d.). How surge pricing works. https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/driver-app/how-surge-works/
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
Warren, E. (2021, September 13). Letter to the Honorable Jerome Powell on Wells Fargo’s financial holding company status. U.S. Senate. https://www.warren.senate.gov/oversight/letters/warren-slams-wells-fargo-ceo-calls-on-fed-to-revoke-banks-status-as-financial-holding-company-amid-ongoing-failure-to-meet-regulatory-requirements
Tip: For each auction pair, state who pays what and why that changes bidding behavior; the “how it uncovers value” part of the rubric depends on explaining bidder incentives.
Frequently asked questions
Is eBay a true Vickrey auction?
Not exactly. It is an open ascending auction, but proxy bidding makes the winner pay about the second-highest maximum bid, similar to Vickrey pricing.
Why do bidders shade bids in first-price auctions?
Because winners pay their own bid, bidding one’s full value leaves no surplus.
Is Wells Fargo actually being sold?
No. The case is hypothetical; the Fed lifted the bank’s asset cap in June 2025.
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